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SHORT EXPRESSIONS OF PERMUTATIONS AS PRODUCTS
AND CRYPTANALYSIS OF THE ALGEBRAIC ERASER
ARKADIUS KALKA, MINA TEICHER, AND BOAZ TSABAN
Abstract. On March 2004, Anshel, Anshel, Goldfeld, and Lemieux intro-
duced the Algebraic Eraser scheme for key agreement over an insecure channel,
using a novel hybrid of infinite and finite noncommutative groups. They also
introduced the Colored Burau Key Agreement Protocol (CBKAP), a concrete
realization of this scheme.
We present general, efficient heuristic algorithms, which extract the shared
key out of the public information provided by CBKAP. These algorithms are,
according to heuristic reasoning and according to massive experiments, suc-
cessful for all sizes of the security parameters, assuming that the keys are
chosen with standard distributions.
Our methods come from probabilistic group theory (permutation group ac-
tions and expander graphs). In particular, we provide a simple algorithm for
finding short expressions of permutations in Sn, as products of given ran-
dom permutations. Heuristically, our algorithm gives expressions of length
O(n2 logn), in time and space O(n3). Moreover, this is provable from the
Minimal Cycle Conjecture, a simply stated hypothesis concerning the uniform
distribution on Sn. Experiments show that the constants in these estimations
are small. This is the first practical algorithm for this problem for n ≥ 256.
Remark. Algebraic Eraser is a trademark of SecureRF. The variant of CBKAP
actually implemented by SecureRF uses proprietary distributions, and thus
our results do not imply its vulnerability.
Received 10 August 2009; received in revised form 18 May 2011; accepted 5
March 2012.
1. Introduction and overview
Starting with the seminal papers [1, 16], several attempts have been made
to construct and analyze public key schemes based on noncommutative groups
and combinatorial, or computational, group theory. One motivation is that such
systems may provide longer term security than existing schemes. Another mo-
tivation, at present theoretical, is that unlike the main present day public key
schemes, these new schemes may be resistant to attacks by quantum comput-
ers. Already in the short run, these connections between combinatorial group
theory and cryptography lead to mathematical questions not asked before, and
consequently to new mathematical and algorithmic results.
In this paper, we study a scheme falling in the above category, whose crypt-
analysis leads to an algorithm with potential applicability beyond the studied
scheme.
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The Algebraic Eraser key agreement scheme was introduced by Anshel, Anshel,
Goldfeld, and Lemieux in the workshop Algebraic Methods in Cryptography held
in Dortmund, Germany, on March 2004, and in the special session on Algebraic
Cryptography, at the Joint International Meeting of the AMS, DMV, and O¨MG,
held in Mainz, Germany, on June 2005. It was subsequently published as [2].
Apart from its mathematical novelty, the Algebraic Eraser has a surpris-
ingly simple concrete realization, the Colored Burau Key Agreement Protocol
(CBKAP), which consists of an efficient combination of matrix multiplications,
applications of permutations, and evaluations of polynomials at elements of a
finite field.
For four years since its introduction, no weakness in CBKAP was reported. On
January 13, 2008, Kalka and Tsaban have described the attack presented here in
Bar-Ilan University’s CGC Seminar [11]. At about the same time (on January
30, 2008), Myasnikov and Ushakov uploaded to the ArXiv eprint server an inde-
pendent attack, and subsequently published it [20]. Myasnikov and Ushakov use
a length based algorithm to break the Third Trusted Party (TTP) component of
CBKAP, with excellent success rates for the parameters proposed in [2]. They in-
dicate that the success rates of their attack drop if the parameters are increased.
In his recent paper [15], Gunnells reproduces Myasnikov and Ushakov’s attack,
and concludes that as the key lengths increase, the attack quickly loses power,
and soon fails in all instances. Furthermore, he provides experiments suggesting
that their attack is not robust against several easily implemented defenses. He
concludes that “the success of the attack seems mainly to be due to it being
applied to short words.” [15]
The security of the main ingredient of CBKAP is not addressed in [20]. Would
fixing the TTP component make the protocol secure? Moreover, in the recent
work [3] it is shown that in many scenarios, there is no need to make both
groups A and B in the protocol public (details below). For this variant, the
attack presented in [20] does not seem applicable [15].
We present an efficient attack, which recovers the shared key out of the public
information, even if one of the involved groups mentioned above remains hidden,
without attacking the TTP’s private key. According to heuristic reasoning as
well as massive experiments, the attack is efficient, and has 100% success rates
for all feasible sizes of the security parameters, assuming standard distributions
on the key spaces.1
The methods, which make the attack applicable to large security parameters,
come from probabilistic group theory, and deal with permutation groups. About
half of the paper is dedicated to a new heuristic algorithm for finding short
expressions of permutations as words in a given set of randomly chosen permu-
tations. This algorithm solves efficiently instances which are intractable using
previously known, provable or heuristic, techniques.
We conclude this introduction with several general comments.
1See the remark at the abstract, which applies to this paper as well as to [20, 15].
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1.1. Construction versus analysis. Few schemes, not counting minor varia-
tions, have been proposed thus far in the context of combinatorial group theory:
Mainly, those in [1, 16], and the one from [2], which is studied here. Most of
the attempts thus far are on the side of analysis of the proposed schemes, rather
than proposals of substantially new ones. Indeed, each of the mentioned schemes
is in fact an infinite family of possible schemes, with at least two degrees of free-
dom: Choosing the platform groups, and choosing the distributions on the chosen
platform group. There are at present no known attacks which are guaranteed to
succeed against all candidate groups (with standard distributions on them), or
against all distributions on certain groups (like the braid group) which can be
sampled efficiently. Thorough analyzes may give indication which choices may
lead to secure schemes.
1.2. Key generation in infinite groups or monoids. There is a canonical
distribution on infinite groups or monoids generated by finitely many generators
g1, . . . , gk. This is defined by fixing a length parameter L, and then taking a
product of L elements gi, each chosen with uniform distribution from the set
{g1, . . . , gk}.2 This is not a uniform distribution on the group,3 but the distri-
bution induced from the uniform distribution on the words of length L in the
free monoid. Since the distributions are not specified in [2], we (as well as Myas-
nikov and Ushakov [20] and Gunnells [15]) assume these natural distributions
when finitely generated groups or monoids are considered, and the uniform dis-
tribution when finite sets are considered. By Gunnells result [15], the results of
the present paper form the first cryptanalysis of CBKAP for these distributions,
which works for all key sizes.
1.3. Provable security. Given a cryptographic scheme, it is desirable to have
a simply stated (and apparently hard) algorithmic problem such that, if the
given scheme can be broken, then there is an efficient algorithm for the prob-
lem. From a cryptographic point of view, there is no point in doing so when
a scheme can be cryptanalyzed, as is the case here. We believe, however, that
cryptanalyses will improve our understanding of schemes based on combinatorial
group theory, and this may lead, eventually, to introduction of schemes which
look promising (i.e., resist known cryptanalyses). Then, establishing a provable
link between the security of the scheme and the difficulty of a simply stated and
apparently hard algorithmic problem would be an important task, which would
help understanding better the (potential) security of the scheme.
2. The Algebraic Eraser scheme
We describe here the general framework. The concrete realization will be
described later.
2In the case of a group, we first extend the list of generators, if necessary, so that for each
g in the list, g−1 is also in the list.
3Since the group or monoid is countably infinite, there is no uniform distribution on it.
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2.1. Notation, terminology, and conventions. A monoid is a set M with
a distinguished element 1 ∈ M , equipped with an associative multiplication
operation for which 1 acts as an identity. Readers not familiar with this notion
may replace “monoid” with “group” everywhere, since this is the main case
considered here.
Let G be a group acting on a monoid M on the left, that is, to each g ∈ G
and each a ∈M , a unique element denoted ga ∈M is assigned, such that:
(1) 1a = a;
(2) gha = g(ha); and
(3) g(ab) = ga · gb
for all a, b ∈M, g, h ∈ G.
M ×G, with the operation(
a, g
) ◦ (b, h) = (a · gb, gh),
is a monoid denoted M ⋊G, and called the semi-direct product of M and G.
Let N be a monoid, and ϕ : M → N a homomorphism. The algebraic eraser
operation is the function ⋆ : (N ×G)× (M ⋊G)→ (N ×G) defined by
(1)
(
a, g
)
⋆
(
b, h
)
=
(
aϕ(gb), gh
)
.
M ⋊G acts on the right on N ×G, that is, the following identity holds:
(2)
(
(a, g) ⋆ (b, h)
)
⋆
(
c, r
)
=
(
a, g
)
⋆
(
(b, h) ◦ (c, r))
for all (a, g) ∈ N ×G, (b, h), (c, r) ∈M ×G.
Submonoids A,B of M ⋊G are ⋆-commuting if
(3)
(
ϕ(a), g
)
⋆
(
b, h
)
=
(
ϕ(b), h
)
⋆
(
a, g
)
for all (a, g) ∈ A, (b, h) ∈ B. In particular, if A,B ⋆-commute, then
ϕ(a)ϕ(gb) = ϕ(b)ϕ(ha)
for all (a, g) ∈ A, (b, h) ∈ B.
2.1.1. Didactic convention. Since the actions are superscripted, we try to mini-
mize the use of subscripts. As a rule, whenever two parties, Alice and Bob, are
involved, we try to use for Bob letters which are subsequent to the letters used
for Alice (as is suggested by their names).
2.2. The Algebraic Eraser Key Agreement Scheme.
2.2.1. Public information.
(1) The group G and the monoids M,N .
(2) A positive integer m.
(3) ⋆-commuting submonoids A,B of M ⋊ G, each given in terms of a gen-
erating set of size k.
(4) Element-wise commuting submonoids C,D of N .
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Remark 1. For clarity of exposition, we assume thatm, k are public, and identical
for Alice’s and Bob’s parts. However, this assumption is not required for the
scheme to work, nor for its cryptanalysis described below.
2.2.2. The protocol.
(1) Alice chooses c ∈ C and (a1, g1), . . . , (am, gm) ∈ A, and sends
(p, g) = (c, 1) ⋆ (a1, g1) ⋆ · · · ⋆ (am, gm) ∈ N ×G
(the ⋆-multiplication is carried out from left to right) to Bob.
(2) Bob chooses d ∈ D, (b1, h1), . . . , (bm, hm) ∈ B, and sends
(q, h) = (d, 1) ⋆ (b1, h1) ⋆ · · · ⋆ (bm, hm) ∈ N ×G
to Alice.
(3) Alice and Bob compute the shared key:
(cq, h) ⋆ (a1, g1) ⋆ · · · ⋆ (am, gm) = (dp, g) ⋆ (b1, h1) ⋆ · · · ⋆ (bm, hm).
We will soon explain why this equality holds.
For the sake of mathematical analysis, it is more convenient to reformulate this
protocol as follows. The public information remains the same. In the notation
of Section 2.2.2, define
(a, g) = (a1, g1) ◦ · · · ◦ (am, gm) ∈ A;
(b, h) = (b1, h1) ◦ · · · ◦ (bm, hm) ∈ B.
By Equations (2) and (1), Alice and Bob transmit the information
(p, g) = (c, 1) ⋆ (a1, g1) ⋆ · · · ⋆ (am, gm) = (c, 1) ⋆ (a, g) = (cϕ(a), g);
(q, h) = (d, 1) ⋆ (b1, h1) ⋆ · · · ⋆ (bm, hm) = (d, 1) ⋆ (b, h) = (dϕ(b), h).
Using this and Equation (3), we see in the same manner that the shared key is
(cq, h) ⋆ (a, g) = (cqϕ(ha), hg) =(4)
= (cdϕ(b)ϕ(ha), hg) = (dcϕ(a)ϕ(gb), gh) =
= (dpϕ(gb), gh) = (dp, g) ⋆ (b, h).
2.3. When M is a group. In the concrete examples for the Algebraic Eraser
scheme, M is a group [2]. Consequently, M ⋊G is also a group, with inversion
(a, g)−1 = (g
−1
a−1, g−1)
for all (a, g) ∈M ⋊G.
3. A general attack on the scheme
We will attack a stronger scheme, where only one of the groups A or B is
made public. Without loss of generality, we may assume that A is known. A
is generated by a given k-element subset. Let (a1, s1), . . . , (ak, sk) ∈ M ⋊ G be
the given generators of A. Let S = {s1, . . . , sk}. S±1 denotes the symmetrized
generating set {s1, . . . , sk, s−11 , . . . , s−1k }.
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3.1. Assumptions.
3.1.1. Distributions and complexity. Alice and Bob make their choices according
to certain distributions. Whenever we mention a probability, it is meant with
respect to the relevant distribution. All assertions made here are meant to hold
“with significant probability” and the generation of elements must be possible
within the available computational power. We will quantify our statements later.
Assumption 2. It is possible to generate an element (α, 1) ∈ A with α 6= 1.
Assumption 2 is equivalent to the possibility of generating (α, g) ∈ A such
that the order o of g in G is smaller than the order of (α, g) in M ⋊G. Indeed,
in this case (α, g)o is as required.
Assumption 3. N is a subgroup of GLn(F) for some field F and some n.
We do not make any assumption on the field F.
Alice generates an element (a, g) ∈ A, and in particular she generates g in the
subgroup of G generated by S.
Assumption 4. Given g ∈ 〈S〉, g can be explicitly expressed as a product of
elements of S±1.
3.2. The attack.
3.2.1. First phase: Finding d and ϕ(b) up to a scalar. By ⋆-commutativity of A
and B, and since (b, h) ∈ B, we have that for each (α, 1) ∈ A,
(5) ϕ(α)ϕ(b) = ϕ(b)ϕ(hα).
By Assumption 2, we can generate such equations with α known, so that only
ϕ(b) is unknown.
Now, q = dϕ(b) is a part of the transmitted information. Substituting ϕ(b) =
d−1q in Equation (5), we obtain
dϕ(α) = (qϕ(hα)q−1)d,
where only d is unknown. Moreover, as C,D commute element-wise, we have
that
(6) dγ = γd
for all γ ∈ C.
Even for just one nontrivial α and one γ ∈ C, we obtain 2n2 equations on
the n2 entries of d. Thus, if standard distributions were used to generate the
keys, we expect, heuristically, that the solution space will be one-dimensional.
(As this is a homogeneous equation and the matrices are invertible, the solution
space cannot be zero-dimensional.) If it is accidentally not, we can generate more
equations in the same manner.4
4In the case of CBKAP (the concrete realization described below), one equation of each type
was enough in all experiments we have conducted. Except for few exceptions in tiny parameter
settings, where exhaustive search of the key can be carried out easily.
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More formally, let d, d˜ be solutions to Equations (5) and (6), say for (α1, 1), . . . ,
(αr, 1) ∈ A, and γ1, . . . , γs ∈ C. Then
d˜d−1 = d˜ϕ(αi)(dϕ(αi))
−1 = (qϕ(hαi)q
−1)d˜((qϕ(hαi)q
−1)d)−1 =
= (qϕ(hαi)q
−1)d˜d−1(qϕ(hαi)q
−1)−1,
and thus d˜d−1 commutes with qϕ(hαi)q−1, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , r}.
Moreover, d˜d−1 commutes with all elements of C, and thus is in the centralizer
of
{qϕ(hα1)q−1, . . . , qϕ(hαr)q−1} ∪ {γ1, . . . , γs}.
Similarly, we have that d−1d˜ is in the centralizer of
{ϕ(α1), . . . , ϕ(αr)} ∪ {γ1, . . . , γs}.
Our precise assumption is that for some, not large, numbers r, s, we have that
with high probability, (at least) one of these centralizers is one-dimensional.
Since C is, by assumption, a group of matrices, this means that this centralizer
is not larger than the centralizer of the full matrix group GLn(F), i.e. the scalar
matrices. (Observe that d−1d˜ is scalar if and only if d˜d−1 is.)
If one can find a small generating set {γ1, . . . , γs} for C,5 then the assumption
tells that the centralizer of
{ϕ(hα1), . . . , ϕ(hαr)} ∪ q−1Cq
or of
{ϕ(α1), . . . , ϕ(αr)} ∪ C
is one-dimensional.
Thus, heuristically, we assume that we have found xd for some unknown scalar
x ∈ F. Now use our knowledge of q = dϕ(b) to compute
(xd)−1q =
1
x
d−1q =
1
x
ϕ(b).
In summary: We know xd and x−1ϕ(b), for some unknown scalar x ∈ F.
3.2.2. Second phase: Generating elements with a prescribed G-coordinate and ex-
tracting the key. Using Assumption 4, find i1, . . . , iℓ ∈ {1, . . . , k} and ǫ1, . . . , ǫℓ ∈
{1,−1} such that
g = sǫ1i1 · · · sǫℓiℓ .
Compute
(δ, g) = (ai1 , si1)
ǫ1 ◦ · · · ◦ (aid , siℓ)ǫℓ ∈ A.
δ may or may not be equal to a.
Remark 5. If M is finitely generated as a monoid, the expression in Assumption
4 should be as a product of elements of S. In the cases discussed later in this
paper, G = Sn and the methods of Section 5 can be adjusted to obtain positive
expressions (Remark 10).
5Indeed, in CBKAP, described below, C is cyclic.
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By ⋆-commutativity of (δ, g) and (b, h), ϕ(b)ϕ(hδ) = ϕ(δ)ϕ(gb), and thus we
can compute
x−1ϕ(gb) = ϕ(δ)−1(x−1ϕ(b))ϕ(hδ).
We are now in a position to compute the secret part of the shared key, using
Equation (5):
(xd)p(x−1ϕ(gb)) = dpϕ(gb).
The attack is complete.
4. Cryptanalysis of CBKAP
Anshel, Anshel, Goldfeld, and Lemieux propose in [2] an efficient concrete
realization which they name Colored Burau Key Agreement Protocol (CBKAP).
We give the details, and then describe how our cryptanalysis applies in this case.
4.1. CBKAP. CBKAP is the Eraser Key Agreement scheme in the following
particular case. Fix positive integers n and r, and a prime number p.
(1) G = Sn, the symmetric group on the n symbols {1, . . . , n}. Sn acts on
M = GLn(Fp(t1, . . . , tn)) by permuting the variables {t1, . . . , tn}.
(2) N = GLn(Fp).
(3) M⋊Sn is the subgroup of GLn(Fp(t1, . . . , tn))⋊Sn, generated by (x1, s1),
. . . , (xn−1, sn−1), where si is the transposition (i, i+ 1), and
x1 =


−t1 1
0 1
. . .
1

 ; xi =


1
. . .
1 0 0
ti −ti 1
0 0 1
. . .
1


for i = 2, . . . , n− 1. Only the ith row of xi differs from the correspond-
ing row of the identity matrix. A direct calculation shows that (xi, si)
commutes with (xj , sj) when |i− j| > 1, and that
(xi, si)(xi+1, si+1)(xi, si) = (xi+1, si+1)(xi, si)(xi+1, si+1).
Thus, the colored Burau group M⋊Sn is a representation of Artin’s braid
group Bn, determined by mapping each Artin generator σi to (xi, si),
i = 1, . . . , n− 1.6
(4) ϕ : M → GLn(Fp) is the evaluation map obtained by replacing each
variable ti by a fixed element τi ∈ Fp.
(5) C = D = Fp(κ) is the group of nonzero matrices of the form
ℓ1κ
j1 + · · ·+ ℓrκjr ,
with κ ∈ GLn(Fp) a matrix of order pn−1, ℓ1, . . . , ℓr ∈ Fp, and j1, . . . , jr ∈
Z.
6Additional details on the colored Burau group can be found in, e.g., [18].
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Remark 6. Let f(x) be the characteristic polynomial of κ. Then x 7→ κ induces
an isomorphism from Fpn = F[x]/〈f(x)〉 onto C = D, that is, C and D are the
image of F∗pn in GLn(Fp), or in other words, the nonsplit torus in GLn(Fp).
Commuting subgroups of M ⋊G are chosen once, by a trusted party, as follows:
(1) Fix I1, I2 ⊆ {1, . . . , n− 1} such that for all i ∈ I1 and j ∈ I2, |i− j| ≥ 2.
|I1| and |I2| are both ≤ n/2.
(2) Define L = 〈σi : i ∈ I1〉 and U = 〈σj : j ∈ I2〉, subgroups of Bn generated
by Artin generators.
(3) L and U commute element-wise. Add to both groups the central element
∆2 of Bn.
(4) Choose a random z ∈ Bn.
(5) Choose w1, . . . , wk ∈ zLz−1, v1, . . . , vk ∈ zUz−1, each a product of t gen-
erators (t is a parameter of the scheme). Transform them into Garside
left normal form, and remove all even powers of ∆. Reuse the names
w1, . . . , wk, v1, . . . , vk for the resulting braids.
(6) Let ρ : Bn →M ⋊Sn be the colored Burau representation function. A,B
are the subgroups of ρ(zLz−1), ρ(zUz−1) generated by ρ(w1), . . . , ρ(wk),
and by ρ(v1), . . . , ρ(vk), respectively.
(7) w1, . . . , wk, v1, . . . , vk are made public.
To carry out our attack, it suffices to assume that the image in the colored Burau
group of one of the sets {w1, . . . , wk} or {v1, . . . , vk}, is given.
4.1.1. Parameter settings and efficiency. These issues are discussed in detail in
[2]. For the parameters proposed there, it is shown that CBKAP can be im-
plemented efficiently, even on small devices as RFID tags. However, we are
interested in the more general question, whether some parameters may make
CBKAP secure. E.g., CBKAP can be implemented on standard PC-s with pa-
rameters much larger than those proposed in [2], and still be more efficient than
the ordinary schemes based on RSA, Diffie-Hellman in Z∗p, or elliptic curves. We
will show that even for such large parameters, CBKAP can be broken.
4.2. The attack. Assumption 3, that N is a subgroup of GLn(F) for some field
F, is a part of the definition of CBKAP. We consider the remaining ones.
4.2.1. Regarding Assumption 2. This assumption amounted to: It is possible to
generate, efficiently, an element (α, σ) ∈ A such that the order o of σ is smaller
than that of (α, σ).
In the notation of Section 4.1, {i, i + 1 : i ∈ I1} decomposes to a family I of
maximal intervals [i, ℓ] = {i, i+ 1, . . . , ℓ}, and ∑[i,ℓ]∈I ℓ− i+ 1 ≤ n/2. Now
U = 〈∆2〉 ⊕
⊕
[i,ℓ]∈I
Bℓ−i+1.
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Each considered s is a permutation induced by the braid ∆2mzwz−1 with w ∈ L.
Let π : Bn → Sn be the canonical homomorphism. Then
s = π(∆2mzwz−1) = π(∆2)mπ(z)π(w)π(z)−1 = π(z)π(w)π(z)−1,
is conjugate to π(w). On each component, this is a product of many random
transpositions, and is therefore an almost uniformly-random permutation on that
component. We therefore have the following:
(1) U/〈∆2〉 decomposes into a direct product of braid groups, whose indices
do not sum up to more than n/2.
(2) π(U) decomposes into a direct product of symmetric groups, whose in-
dices do not sum up to more than n/2.
(3) For generic7 (a, s) ∈ A, π(z)−1sπ(z) is generic on each part of the men-
tioned decomposition.
The probability that the order of a random permutation in Sn is ≤ n is O(1/ 4
√
n)
[6]. Thus, we can find an element (a, s) ∈ A with s of order ≤ n by generating
(roughly 4
√
n) elements (a, s) ∈ A, until the order of s is as required.
On the other hand, the element (a, s) is a representation of an element of the
braid group, which is known to be torsion-free [19]. While it may be that the
representation used here is not faithful,8 it is very unlikely that (a, s) could have
finite order.
The remainder of this paper is dedicated to Assumption 4.
5. Membership search in generic permutation groups
For the second phase of our attack, we need to find a short expression of a given
permutation from G in terms of given “random” permutations. In CBKAP, the
group G typically has the form π−1Hπ ≤ Sn, where π ∈ Sn, H is Sn/2 or An/2,
and H is embedded in Sn in a natural way (supported by the n/2 higher indices).
The conjugation is just relabeling of the indices 1, . . . , n. Thus, we may reduce
the problem to the case G = Sn. Modifications of the algorithm can be made,
that will make it applicable to any (conjugation of) direct product of groups of
the form An or Sn.
For concrete generators, the problem of finding short expressions for given
permutations is well known, and in similar form occurs in the analysis of the
Rubik’s cube and other puzzles. The best known heuristics for solving it in these
cases are based on Minkwitz’s algorithms [17], and are incapable of managing
Problem 7 for random s1, . . . , sk ∈ Sn where n is large (say, n ≥ 128), as our
experiments below show.
Problem 7. Given random s1, . . . , sk ∈ Sn and s ∈ 〈s1, . . . , sk〉, express s as a
short product of elements from {s1, . . . , sk}±1.
7By “generic” we mean a typical element with respect to the relevant distribution.
8It is open whether the colored Burau representation is faithful, even without reduction of
the integers modulo p.
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In Problem 7, short could mean of polynomial length, or of length manageable
by the given computational power as explained above. In any case, the length
is the number of letters in the expression, and not the length of a compressed
version of the expression. This limitation comes from the intended application,
where elements of the infinite monoid require storage space which grows with
multiplication, and circumventing this problem by performing one ⋆ multiplica-
tion for each letter in the word makes it impossible to square in a single operation.
If the word is too long (e.g., of the form a(2
64) for a single generator a), the second
phase of the attack becomes infeasible.
Much work was carried out on this problem, by Babai, Beals, Hetyei, Hayes,
Kantor, Lubotzky, Seress, and others (see [7, 5, 6] and references therein). The
works of Babai, Beals, Hayes, and Seress [6, 5] imply that there is a Las Vegas
algorithm for Problem 7, producing expressions of length n7(logn)O(1). This re-
markable result solves our problem for moderately small values of n. However, for
n ≥ 128, the resulting expression is too long to be practical. Our algorithm may
be viewed as a (substantial) heuristic simplification of the algorithms induced by
their works.
A classical result of Dixon [9] tells that two random elements of Sn, almost
always generates An (if all generators are even permutations) or Sn (otherwise).
Babai proved that getting An or Sn happens in probability 1 − 1/n + O(1/n2)
[4]. Moreover, experiments show that this probability is very close to 1 − 1/n
even for small n, i.e., the O(1/n2) is negligible also for small n. This generalizes
to arbitrary k, as follows.
Theorem 8 (Dixon). The asymptotic probability that k random elements of Sn
generate An or Sn is roughly 1− n−k+1.
Since we do not know of a reference for a proof, we include a proof, suggested
to us by Dixon.
Proof of Theorem 8. In Section 4 of [10] it is shown that the probability that k
random permutations generate a transitive group is roughly 1− n−k+1.
The proof of Lemma 2 in [9] can be modified to show that the proportion of
pairs (x, y) with x, y ∈ Sn which are contained in an imprimitive group (not
necessarily generating the imprimitive group) is at most 2−n/4. Hence, the pro-
portion of k-tuples contained in an imprimitive group is bounded by 2−n/4 for
all k > 1.
Theorem 2.8 of Babai’s paper [4] states that the probability that k random
permutations generate a primitive group different from An or Sn is smaller than
(n
√
n/n!)k−1 (generalizing his theorem when k = 2), which is exponentially small.

Given that we obtain An or Sn, the probability of the former case is 2
−k. How-
ever, since k = 2 is of classical interest, we do not neglect this case. Thus, for
randomly chosen permutations Problem 7 reduces (with a small loss in probabil-
ity) to the following one.
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Problem 9.
(1) Given random s, s1, . . . , sk ∈ An, express s as a short product of elements
from {s1, . . . , sk}±1.
(2) Given random s, s1, . . . , sk ∈ Sn with some si /∈ An, express s as a short
product of elements from {s1, . . . , sk}±1.
A solution of Problem 9(1) implies a solution of Problem 9(2): Let I = {i :
si /∈ An}. I 6= ∅. Fix i0 ∈ I, and for each i ∈ I, replace the generator si with
the generator si0si ∈ An. Then {si0si : i ∈ I} ∪ {si : i /∈ I} is a set of k nearly
random elements of An (cf. [6]). If s ∈ An, use (1) to obtain a short expression
of s in terms of the new generators. This gives an expression in the original
generators of at most double length. Otherwise, si0s ∈ An and its expression
gives an expression of s in terms of the original generators.
Thus, in principle one may restrict attention to Problem 9(1). However, we
do not take this approach, since we want to make use of transpositions when we
can.
5.1. The algorithm.
5.1.1. Conventions.
(1) During the algorithm’s execution, the expressions of some of the com-
puted permutations in terms of the original generators should be stored.
We do not write this explicitly.
(2) The statement for each τ ∈ 〈S〉 means that the elements of 〈S〉 are
considered one at a time, by first considering the elements of S±1, then
all (free-reduced) products of two elements from S±1, etc. (a breadth-first
search), until an end statement is encountered.
(3) For s ∈ (S±1)∗, len(s) denotes the length of s as a free-reduced word. s
is identified in the usual way with the permutation which is the product
of the letters in s.
We are now ready to describe the steps of our algorithm. We do not consider
the question of optimal values for the parameters and other optimizations. This
is left for future investigation.
Input: G = Sn or An; generators s1, . . . , sk of G; s ∈ G.
Initialization:
c =
{
2 G = Sn
3 G = An
C is the set of c-cycles in a canonical expression of s as a product of c-cycles.
Step 1: Find a short c-cycle in 〈s1, . . . , sk〉.
For each τ ∈ 〈s1, . . . , sk〉:
If there is m ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that τm is a c-cycle:
µ← τm;
End Step 1.
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The result µ of Step 1 is forwarded to the next step.
Step 2: Find short expressions for additional c-cycles.
A0 ← {µ};
For l = 1, 2, . . . :
Al ← ∅;
For each i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, each ǫ ∈ {−1, 1}, and each a ∈ Al−1:
If s−ǫi as
ǫ
i /∈ A0 ∪ · · · ∪Al, add s−ǫi asǫi to Al;
When C ⊆ A0 ∪ · · · ∪ Al:
End Step 2.
Final step: Find a short expression for s.
Use the expressions of the c-cycles in C to get an expression of s in terms of the
original generators.
Remark 10 (Positive expressions). If one seeks for a positive expression for s in
terms of {s1, . . . , sk}, we can repeatedly activate Step 1, consider only words
τ ∈ S∗, to generate enough c-cycles to present s. This algorithm is more time
consuming this way.
6. Analysis of the generic membership search algorithm
6.1. Asymptotic analysis. We provide an asymptotic (in n) analysis of the
time complexity and the final expression length, for the generic membership
search algorithm (Section 5.1), modulo a probabilistic conjecture, which we later
support by heuristic reasoning as well as extensive experiments.
6.1.1. Step 1.
Conjecture 11 (Minimal Cycle Conjecture). Let S be a set of k elements of
Sn, each chosen independently, according to the uniform distribution on Sn. Let
c = 3 if all elements of S are even, and 2 otherwise.
Consider the following list: The elements of S±1, followed by all products of
two of elements of S±1, followed by all products of three elements of S±1, etc.
Then, almost always,9 there is among the first n2 elements of the list an element
τ such that τm is a c-cycle, for some m ≤ n.
In short, the Minimal Cycle Conjecture asserts that in Step 1, almost always,
at most n2 permutations are considered.
Lemma 12. Given an element τ ∈ Sn, deciding whether there is m ≤ n such
that τm is a c-cycle can be done in time O(n). Finding the minimal such m, if
it exists, can be done in time O(n logn).
Proof. Let ℓ1, ℓ2, . . . , ℓk be the cycle lengths in the cycle decomposition of τ , which
can be computed in linear time. There is m as required if, and only if, there is a
unique i ≤ k such that ℓi = c, and for each j ≤ k different from i, ℓj is relatively
9That is, with probability approaching 1 as n→∞.
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prime to c, which can be verified in time O(log ℓj).
10 As
∑
j 6=i log ℓj ≤
∑
j ℓj ≤ n,
the whole procedure is O(n).
The minimal power m, if it exists, is lcm(ℓj : j 6= i). This can be computed
by partitioning the list into pairs, computing the lcm of each pair to obtain a
half length list, and doing the same for this list. After O(log k) steps, we obtain
the lcm. Each step requires roughly
∑
log ℓi operations, and overall we have
(log k)
∑
log ℓi which is O(n logn). 
Corollary 13. Assume that Minimal Cycle Conjecture. Then, almost always,
Step 1 produces a c-cycle µ, expressed as a product of O(n logn) elements of S±1,
in time and space O(n3) (or, alternatively, in time O(n3 logn) and space O(n)).
Proof. To produce the list of n2 permutations, we have to compute n2 products of
permutations (the product of an already computed permutation and an element
of S±1), each requiring n operations. After each such multiplication, we check
whether the result τ has the property that τm is a c-cycle for some m ≤ n. This
is done by Lemma 12.
In summary, we have n2 steps, each consisting one multiplication of permuta-
tions, and one linear time decision. Thus, the overall time complexity is O(n3).
If τ is among the first n2 elements of the sequence, then τ is a product of at
most log2k(n
2) = O(logn) elements of S±1, and therefore τm is expressed as a
product of at most O(m logn), which is O(n logn).
Alternatively, one can compute, for each new word in the generators, the whole
product. This increases the time complexity to O(n3 log n), but reduces the space
complexity to O(n). 
6.1.2. Step 2. Let S be a set of k elements of Sn, each chosen independently,
according to the uniform distribution on Sn. Consider the graph Gn,k,c with
vertices all c-cycles, such that there is an edge between u, v if and only if there is
r ∈ S±1 with r−1ur = v. This graph has n!/(n−c)!c vertices and is 2k-regular. In
the worst case we have to compute in Step 2 all vertices of this graph before this
procedure terminates. For every a ∈ Al, l ≥ 1, keeping track of its predecessor
in Al−1, Step 2 computes a spanning tree of this graph, rooted at µ. Let ℓ be
the value of l at the termination of Step 2. ℓ is the height of our tree, and the
diameter d of this graph satisfies ℓ ≤ d ≤ 2ℓ.
For each a ∈ Al, 1 ≤ l ≤ ℓ− 1, 2k − 1 conjugations are performed. Indeed for
each a ∈ Al, by considering which conjugator led to it, the inverse conjugator
will not lead to anything new and is thus not performed. Only for the root we
perform 2k conjugations, but no one for all a ∈ Aℓ. Thus, the overall number of
conjugations in this step is bounded above by
2k|A0|+(2k−1)
ℓ−1∑
l=1
|Al| = 1+(2k−1)
ℓ∑
l=0
|Al|−(2k−1)|Aℓ| ≤ (2k − 1)n!
(n− c)!c −2k+2.
10Considering standard CPU operations as requiring constant time.
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Remark 14. In fact, as S generates G, it also generates it as a monoid, and thus
it suffices to consider conjugations by positive generators only, so that the overall
number of conjugations is less than (k − 1)n!/(n− c)!c− k + 2. Moreover, with
high probability one can restrict attention to just two generators generating G,
so the number of conjugations becomes less than n!/(n − c)!c < nc/c. Here,
we have to consider a digraph rather than a graph. The vertices are again all
c-cycles and there is a directed edge from u to v iff r−1ur = v for some r ∈ S.
However, the diameter of this digraph is greater or equal than that of Gn,k,c.
Corollary 15. The running time of Step 2 is O(n2) if G = Sn and O(n
3) if
G = An.
Proof. Let c = 2 if G = Sn and 3 if G = An. Each conjugation of a c-cycle
requires c ≤ 3 operations:
p(i j)p−1 = (p(i) p(j))
p(i j k)p−1 = (p(i) p(j) p(k)).
Thus, the running time is a small constant times the number of conjugations,
which is bounded by (2k−1)nc/c (or less if we work according to Remark 14). 
For each permutation σ encountered during our algorithm, let len(σ) be the
length of its expression as a product of the given permutations s1, . . . , sk and
their inverses. Recall that µ is the output of Step 1. Then for each c-cycle
σ ∈ A0 ∪ · · · ∪ Aℓ,
len(σ) ≤ len(µ) + 2ℓ.
Corollary 16. Using the above notation, the length of the obtained expression
for s is smaller than n/(c− 1) · (len(µ) + 2ℓ).
Proof. s is a product of at most n/(c− 1) c-cycles. 
The following theorem consists of Theorems 2.2 and 3.3 of [12].
Theorem 17.
(1) Fix k ≥ 2, c ≥ 1 and a real ǫ > 0.
Let S be a set of k elements of Sn, each chosen independently, according
to the uniform distribution on Sn.
Let Dn,k,c be the digraph with whose vertices are the c-tuples of distinct
elements of {1, . . . , n}, and where there is an arrow from (a1, . . . , ac) to
(b1, . . . , bc) if and only if (b1, . . . , bc) = (s(a1), . . . , s(ac)) for some s ∈ S.
Then, almost always, Dn,k,c is an α-expander, for
α = ((1− ǫ)/2)(1− (√2k − 1/k)1/(1+c)).
(2) The diameter of an α-expander with v vertices is smaller than 2(1 +
log1+α v).
Corollary 18. For k ≥ 2, c ≥ 1, the diameter of the graph Gn,k,c is almost
always bounded by 2(1 + c log1+α(n)) with α = (1− (
√
2k − 1/k)1/(1+c))/2.
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Proof. Consider the equivalence relation ∼ on the set of c-tuples of distinct ele-
ments of {1, . . . , n}, which identifies tuples if each is a cyclic rotation of the other.
The quotient digraph Dn,k,c/ ∼ is exactly the digraph mentioned in Remark 14.
Thus, ℓ is smaller than its diameter, which is smaller than the diameter of Dn,k,c.
By Theorem 17, the latter is smaller than
2(1 + log1+α(n
c)) = 2(1 + c log1+α n). 
Corollary 19. Assume the Minimal Cycle Conjecture. The length of the ob-
tained expression for s is O(n2 log n).
Proof. By Corollary 16, the length of the obtained expression for s isO(n(len(µ)+
2ℓ)). By Corollary 13, len(µ) is O(n logn). By Corollary 18, the diameter of our
graph Gn,k,c is O(logn), and in particular so is ℓ. 
6.2. Heuristic evidence and estimation.
6.2.1. Step 1. The following terminology and lemma will make the proof of the
subsequent theorem shorter. The cycle structure of a permutation s ∈ Sn is the
sequence (n1, n2, . . . ) of lengths of cycles of s which are not fixed points. Let
σn(n1,...,nk) denote the number of elements of Sn with cycle structure (n1, . . . , nk).
Lemma 20. For distinct n1, . . . , nk: σ
n
(n1,...,nk)
= n!
(n−(n1+···+nk))!·n1···nk .
Proof. First choose the n1 + · · ·+ nk elements which will occupy the cycles and
consider all their permutations, and then divide out cyclic rotation equivalence,
to get (
n
n1 + · · ·+ nk
)
· (n1 + · · ·+ nk)! · 1
n1 · · ·nk .
This is equal to σn(n1,...,nk). 
Proposition 21. Let c be 2 if G = Sn, and 3 if G = An. For random τ ∈ G, the
probability that there is d ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that τd is a c-cycle is greater than
1/cn.
Proof. In fact, we give better bounds for most values of n. We consider the
probabilities to have cycle structures (n− d, c) or (n− d, e, c) for appropriate d,
such that if τ has such a cycle structure, then τn−d is a c-cycle. The restrictions
on the cycle structures are as follows.
(1) c does not divide n− d; and
(2) e divides n− d (in the case (n− d, e, c)).
In the case G = An, we also must have that the cycle structure is possible in An:
(3) n− d is odd (in the case (n− d, 3));
(4) n− d+ e is even (in the case (n− d, e, 3)).
Assuming these restrictions, we compute the probabilities of these cycle struc-
tures using Lemma 20. In Sn, the probability for (n− d, 2) is
1
|Sn| · σ
n
(n−d,2) =
1
(d− 2)! · (n− d) · 2 >
1
(d− 2)! · 2n.
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In An, the probabilities for (n− d, 3) and (n− d, e, 3) are
1
|An| · σ
n
(n−d,3) =
2
(d− 3)! · (n− d) · 3 >
2
(d− 3)! · 3n,
1
|An| · σ
n
(n−d,e,3) =
2
(d− e− 3)! · (n− d) · e · 3 >
2
(d− e− 3)! · 3en,
respectively. We now consider some possible cycle structure with at most one
cycle of each length, and describe the restrictions they pose on n and their
probabilities.
For G = Sn, we have the following.
n mod 2 Cycle structure Prob. Accumulated probability
0 (n− 3, 2) 1/2n
(n− 5, 2) 1/12n 7/12n
1 (n− 2, 2) 1/2n
(n− 4, 2) 1/4n 3/4n
For G = A7, we can compute directly that the cycle structure (2, 2, 3) has
probability 1/12, which is greater than 1/3 · 7, as required. For all other n, we
have the following.
n mod 6 Cycle structure Prob. Accumulated probability
0 (n− 5, 3) 1/3n 1/3n
1 (n− 5, 2, 3) 1/3n
(n− 6, 3) 1/9n 4/9n
2 (n− 3, 3) 2/3n 2/3n
3 (n− 4, 3) 2/3n
(n− 5, 2, 3) 1/3n 1/n
4 (n− 3, 3) 2/3n
(n− 5, 3) 1/3n
(n− 6, 2, 3) 1/3n 4/3n
5 (n− 4, 3) 2/3n
(n− 6, 3) 1/9n
(n− 7, 2, 3) 1/6n 17/18n
This completes the proof. 
Corollary 22. Let c be 2 if G = Sn, and 3 if G = An. Execute Step 1 with
random elements τ ∈ G instead of the enumerated ones. The probability that it
does not end before considering λn permutations is smaller than e−λ/c.
Proof. By Corollary 21, the probability of not obtaining a c-cycle for λn randomly
chosen τ ∈ G is at most(
1− 1
cn
)λn
=
((
1− 1
cn
)cn)λ
c
< (e−1)
λ
c = e−
λ
c . 
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Example 23. Let c be 2 if G = Sn, and 3 if G = An, and λ = cλ0 log n for some
constant λ0. Then the probability in Proposition 22 is smaller than
e−
cλ0 log n
c = n−λ0 .
This shows that if we use, in Step 1 of our algorithm, random elements instead
of the enumerated ones, then, almost always, this step halts after the consider-
ation of at most 3n log n permutations. This is much smaller than the n2 in the
Minimal Cycle Conjecture 11. We conjecture that this increase from n log n to
n2 remedies for the fact that in the conjecture, the considered elements are not
independent. Below, we provide experimental evidence for that.
6.2.2. The expression’s length. Using Corollary 18, we can derive a rough upper
bound on the average length of the expression provided by the generic member-
ship search algorithm, assuming the Minimal Cycle Conjecture 11. According to
this conjecture, Step 1 uses on average less than n2 permutations until finding
a good one τ . If τ is the n2-th permutation in our breadth-first enumeration of
〈s1, . . . , sk〉, then its length d as a word in the generators satisfies
(2k − 1)d−1 ≤ 2k(2k − 1)d−2 ≤ n2.
Thus
len(τ) .
2
log(2k − 1) · log n.
Then, µ is at most an n-th power of τ . Thus on average,
len(µ) .
2
log(2k − 1) · n log n.
By Corollary 18, ℓ is on average much smaller than len(µ), and thus by Corollary
16, the average length of the resulting expression is roughly bounded by
2
(c− 1) log(2k − 1) · n
2 log n =
{
2
log(2k−1) · n2 logn G = Sn
1
log(2k−1) · n2 logn G = An.
7. Experimental results
7.1. The full attack. We have implemented our full attack on CBKAP, and
tested it against a large number of parameter settings, including the suggested
ones, smaller ones, much larger ones, and mixed settings (some parameters are
small and some are large). The full attack succeeded to extract the shared key
out of the public information correctly, in all tested cases, including those in
which the generated subgroup of Sn/2 was neither Sn/2 nor An/2.
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7.2. The generic membership search algorithm. We then moved to a sys-
tematic examination of the generic membership search algorithm. This algo-
rithm worked efficiently and successfully in all experiments, and its time, space
and length of output were all surprisingly close to the estimations computed in
the previous sections. The most difficult case for this algorithm is where there
are only k = 2 random generators s1, s2. Thus, we have made a large battery of
experiments for k = 2.
We make the following conventions. The constant c is 2 if G = Sn, and 3 if
G = An. For each n = 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256, we have conducted at least 1000
independent experiments altogether. As k = 2, in about 750 of these experiments
〈s1, s2〉 = Sn, and in about 250, 〈s1, s2〉 = An. The few cases where neither Sn
nor An were generated were ignored.
Each of these many samples suggests a value for the considered parameter.
We thus present the minimum, average, and maximum observed values (with
the average boldfaced).
7.2.1. Step 1. The upper bound n2 in the Minimal Cycle Conjecture 11 turns
out to be an over-estimation for the number of permutations considered in Step
1. Indeed, except for few cases in n = 8, none of our experiments exceeded this
bound. Thus, we present in Table 1 the ratio between the number of permutations
actually considered in Step 1 and the estimation cn, which is what one would
obtained if the permutations were independent.
Table 1. Ratios for the number of permutations in Step 1.
n 8 16 32 64 128 256
Sn 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.01 0 0
2.26 2.53 3.47 5.05 5.4 8.55
112.13 45.88 25.22 102.81 52.62 77.31
An 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0
0.51 0.51 1.35 1.28 2.56 1.9
7.63 4.15 15.5 7.73 12.65 17.5
7.2.2. Length of the final expression. For k = 2, the average length of the final
expression of the given permutation is estimated in Section 6.2.2 to be, roughly,
below
2
(c− 1) log(2k − 1) · n
2 log n =
{
2
log 3
· n2 logn G = Sn
1
log 3
· n2 logn G = An.
(log(3) ≈ 1.1). Table 2 shows that this estimation is surprisingly good, and that
in fact, the true resulting length is on average better than this bound.
The actual lengths of the expressions produced for the given permutations are
given in Table 3. For clarity, the average lengths are rounded to the nearest
integer.
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Table 2. Ratios for the length of the final expression.
n 8 16 32 64 128 256
Sn 0.07 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.1 0.1
0.31 0.45 0.52 0.62 0.63 0.68
1.14 0.97 0.98 1.06 0.99 0.95
An 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.03
0.4 0.4 0.53 0.54 0.62 0.59
0.78 0.87 1.07 0.86 0.9 0.87
Table 3. Expression lengths using the generic membership search algorithm.
n 8 16 32 64 128 256
Sn 16 148 674 2603 14357 65063
76 580 3331 19078 91120 450450
275 1258 6344 33015 143344 631306
An 13 54 248 504 1640 9258
48 261 1698 8328 44739 195534
94 564 3454 13328 65354 286628
For comparison with earlier methods, we looked for expressions of permuta-
tions as short products, using GAP’s [13] Schreier-Sims based algorithm (division
off stabilizer chains), which uses optimizations similar to Minkwitz’s [17]. Here,
we have 100 experiments for Sn and 100 experiments for An. Already for n = 32,
the routines went out of memory in about 1/3 of the cases for An, and in about
2/3 of the cases for Sn. Thus, we also checked n = 24 and n = 28 (n = 28 seems
to be the largest index which the routines handle well). The resulting lengths
are shown in Table 4, where ∞ means “out of memory in too many cases”.
Table 4. Expression lengths using previous heuristics (Schreier-
Sims-Minkwitz).
n 8 16 24 28 32
Sn 5 102 432 1047 ∞
22 255 8039 345272 ∞
42 418 350846 32729135 ∞
An 0 95 549 913 ∞
18 238 4101 59721 ∞
29 413 35447 4012292 ∞
We can see that Schreier-Sims methods are better than ours only for small
values of n, and that they are not applicable for large n, where our algorithm is
easily applicable. Also, note the large difference between the minimal and the
maximal obtained lengths. Contrast this with the results in Table 3.
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8. Possible fixes of the Algebraic Eraser and challenges
As we have demonstrated, no choice of the security parameters makes the
Algebraic Eraser immune to the attack presented here, as long as the keys are
generated by standard distributions.
A possible fix may be to change the group S into one whose elements do not
have short expressions in terms of its generators. This may force the attacker
to attack the original matrices (whose entries are Laurent polynomials in the
variables ti) directly, using linear algebraic methods similar to the ones presented
here. It is not clear to what extent this can be done.
The most promising way to foil our attacks, at least on a small fraction of
keys, may be to use very carefully designed distributions, which are far from
standard ones. Following our attack, Dorian Goldfeld and Paul Gunnels devised
a distribution for which the equations in phase 1 of the attack have a huge number
of solutions, most of which not leading to the correct shared key [14].
Another option would be to work in semigroups, and use noninvertible matri-
ces. This may foil the first phase of our attack.
The generic membership search algorithm is of interest beyond its applicability
to the Algebraic Eraser. We have demonstrated, based on our Minimal Cycle
Conjecture 11, that this algorithm easily solves instances with random permu-
tations, in groups of index which is intractable when using previously known
techniques like those in [17]. Our extensive experiments, reported above, sup-
port this assertion.
The most interesting direction of extending the present work is proving the
Minimal Cycle Conjecture, even with O(n2) instead of our n2. In fact, prov-
ing any polynomial bound would imply that the diameter of Sn is almost al-
ways O(n2 log n), which would improve considerably the presently known bound
n7(logn)O(1) on the diameter. Alexander Hulpke has informed us that our meth-
ods are similar to ones used for constructive recognition of Sn or An. This
connection may be useful for the proposed analysis.
Finally, we point out that even without changes, our algorithm applies in many
cases not treated here, as the experiments of the full attack reported above show.
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